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Abstract
Background: Consumption of fruit and vegetables is important for health, but is often lower than recommended and tends
to be socio-economically patterned with lower consumption in more deprived groups. In 2008, the English Department of
Health introduced the Change4Life convenience store programme. This aimed to increase retail access to fresh fruit and
vegetables in deprived, urban areas by providing existing convenience stores with a range of support and branded point-of-
sale materials and equipment.
Methods: We undertook a mixed-methods study of the Change4Life convenience store programme in the North East of
England around two years after initial implementation. Store mapping (n=87; 100% stores) and systematic in-store
observations (n=74; 85% stores) provided information on intervention fidelity; the variety, purchase price and quality of
fresh fruit and vegetables on sale; and purchase price compared to a major supermarket. Ten qualitative interviews with
a purposive sample of retailers and other professionals explored experiences of the intervention and provided further
insight on quantitative results.
Results: Intervention stores were primarily located in socio-economically disadvantaged areas. Fidelity, in terms of presence
of branded materials and equipment, was low and much was not being used as intended. Fresh fruit and vegetables on sale
were of high quality and had a purchase price around 10% more than comparable products at a major super-
market. Interviewees were supportive of the health improvement aim of the intervention. Retailers were appreciative of
part-funding for chill cabinets and free point-of-sale materials. The intervention suffered from: poor initial and on-going
communication between the intervention delivery team and retailers; poor availability of replacement point-of-sale
materials; and failure to cement intended links with health workers and community organisations.
Conclusions: Overall, intervention fidelity was low and the intervention is unlikely to have had a substantial or long-term
effect on customers’ consumption of fruit and vegetables.
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Introduction
Consumption of fruit and vegetables is important for health. [1]
Promotion of fruit and vegetable consumption is a key public
health strategy, underpinned by the ‘five-a-day’ message (adults
should eat at least five 80 g portions of fruit and vegetables per
day). [2] Yet average daily consumption among UK adults is just
over two portions. [3] Fruit and vegetable consumption in the UK,
as elsewhere, is strongly socio-economically patterned, with lower
consumption among individuals living in more deprived circum-
stances. [3,4]
There has been a recent focus on structural interventions to
promote healthier diets, particularly in more deprived groups. For
example, since 2004, the Scottish Grocers Federation Healthy
Living Programme has promoted fresh fruit and vegetables (FFV),
as well as other ‘healthier’ products, in convenience stores. [5]
These initiatives are often based on the assumptions that
convenient retail access to the components of a healthy diet
increases consumption and that such access is worse in more
deprived areas. [5] In the UK, neither of these assumptions are
supported by robust evidence.
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where it is difficult to buy the components of a healthy diet at
a reasonable price. [6] A recent systematic review found that there
is little evidence for the existence of food deserts in high income
countries other than the USA. [7] Poor retail access to the
components of a healthy diet is, therefore, unlikely to make
a substantial contribution to unhealthy dietary patterns in the UK.
Few robust outcome evaluations of the effects of improved retail
access to fruit and vegetables on dietary quality have been
conducted. [8] A recent systematic review found that small food
store interventions to improve diet may increase availability and
sales of healthy foods, and customer knowledge, but that there is
an absence of evidence of effect on individual diet or health. [8]
Evaluation of the Scottish Grocers Federation Health Living
Programme indicated that the intervention resulted in increased
sales of FFV from participating stores. [9] But, this does not
necessarily equate to increased FFV consumption.
Despite the limited evidence base in this area, in 2008, the
English Department of Health (DH), working in partnership with
the Association of Convenience Stores, embarked on an in-
tervention to improve provision of FFV in convenience stores in
deprived, urban areas in England with poor existing retail access
to FFV. [10] This intervention was branded as part of
Change4Life, the national obesity prevention programme, and
was introduced sequentially across English regions starting in the
North East region.
In the UK, convenience stores are defined as grocery stores
selling food and drink for off-premises consumption as their main
activity, with less than 3000 ft
2 floor area, and open more than
eight hours per day, seven days per week. [11] There were around
50,000 UK convenience stores in 2008, representing approxi-
mately 20% of the food and grocery market. [11]
We conducted a process evaluation of the Change4Life
convenience store intervention in the North East of England.
Methods
We performed a mixed-methods study using quantitative
mapping and systematic in-store observations to provide informa-
tion on intervention fidelity; the variety, purchase price and quality
of FFV on sale; and purchase price compared to a major retailer.
One-to-one qualitative interviews were conducted with a purposive
sample of key stakeholders to explore their experiences of the
intervention and provide further insight on quantitative results.
Intervention Description
Intervention leadership and delivery. Department of
Health civil servants provided strategic leadership for the interven-
tion.Implementationwasco-ordinatedbyaprojectdeliveryteam.A
nationalsteeringgroupconsistedoftheDHteam,theprojectdelivery
team, and national representatives of each of the symbol groups
involved (see below). A regional steering group was also established
consisting of representatives of the DH leadership team, the project
deliveryteam,regionalsymbolgroupmanagers,theregionalobesity
lead, and local health workers (seebelow).
Intervention stores. The UK convenience store sector
includes: independent stores, petrol station forecourt stores,
branches of multiple retailers, and members of symbol groups.
Symbol group stores have common brand identity, and access
wholesale goods via regional managers. All stores that took part in
the intervention were members of symbol groups. Stores were
selected for inclusion by consultation between the project delivery
team and regional symbol group managers. It was intended that all
stores should be located in socio-economically deprived, urban
areas with poor existing retail access to FFV.
Intervention components. An intensive intervention (see
Table 1) was introduced in 17 ‘demonstration’ stores in the North
East region and a less intensive intervention (see Table 1) was
provided to 70 further ‘roll-out’ stores between October 2008 and
June 2009. After initial implementation, the regional steering
group decided that each intervention store should also be linked to
a local ‘health worker’ (public health professional employed by
local primary care organisations) to help develop links to local
schools and community initiatives to which intervention stores
might be able to supply FFV.
Quantitative Research and Systematic In-store
Observations
Inclusion criteria & recruitment. All 87 intervention stores
in the North East of England were eligible to take part in the study.
All stores were mapped based on the demographic profiles of
areas. Stores were also sent a letter informing them that
a researcher would visit their store to conduct observations within
two months of receipt but that they could opt-out of visits if they
wished.
Variables of interest & data collection. Fidelity of the
intervention in terms of location in a deprived, urban area with
poor existing retail access to FFV was explored using mapping.
Postcodes of intervention stores were used to determine the lower
super output area of location (small administrative areas with
mean population of around 1500). [12] Routine data were then
used to determine if stores were located in deprived (defined as the
most deprived 40% of areas in England using the Index of
Multiple Deprivation 2007 [13]), urban (defined as an urban area
with population over 10,000 using National Statistics urban/rural
classification [14]) areas with poor existing retail access to FFV
(defined as located more than 500 m network distance from
a supermarket).
Fidelity of the intervention in terms of intended use of
Change4Life branded point-of-sales materials and equipment
was explored using observations structured by a data collection
proforma. We collected information on the presence or not of
a Change4Life branded chill cabinet, shelve strips, and dedicated
FFV stand and whether or not these were used appropriately (chill
cabinet only to contain FFV or bottled water, with no potatoes,
onions or bananas; shelf strips only on shelves containing FFV;
mobile stand containing only FFV). Store personnel were asked if
the store had a FFV Champion.
Variety, quality and purchase price of FFV were assessed using
observations structured by the data collection proforma. For each
FFV line (i.e. specific different types of products – royal gala
apples, golden delicious apples, braeburn apples etc.) on sale,
quality was assessed and judged to be poor if there was obvious
evidence of skin damage, rot or mould, bruises or discolouration
on any of the items on sale.
A sample of 10 stores was visited simultaneously by an
additional researcher who conducted independent observations.
Inter-rater agreement was above 75% for all items and above 95%
for FFV availability, quality and purchase price. All in-store
observations were conducted in February and March 2011.
Within five weeks of in-store observations, purchase prices of
comparable items available from the largest UK supermarket were
identified and recorded, using www.tesco.com. Mean purchase
price per line as a proportion of purchase price at www.tesco.com
for each store was calculated. As far as possible, products were
matched for line, pack size and brand. Best available matches were
substituted where exact product matches were not available.
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Inclusion criteria & recruitment. Members of two key
stakeholder groups were selected to take part in the qualitative
component: individual retailers, and other professionals involved in
intervention leadership and delivery. Individual retailers were
purposivelysampledtoreflectbothdemonstrationandroll-outstores
and recruited during in-store visits. Other professionals were
purposively sampled to reflect those involved in leadership and
deliveryatavarietyoflevelsandrecruitedviatelephonecallstotheir
workplace.
Data collection & topics of interest. Interviews were
guided by a prospectively developed topic guide that covered
interviewees’ motivation for taking part in the intervention; their
views about barriers and enablers to intervention success; and the
acceptability, value and sustainability of the intervention. Inter-
views were conducted by two researchers (DBW and JH). DBW
has extensive experience of conducting qualitative research
interviews. Both researchers worked together for the first in-
terview. The remainder were conducted solely by JH, with support
and guidance from DBW as required. All interviews were audio
recorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis.
Analysis & Presentation of Data
Quantitative data. Simple summaries of the quantitative
data are presented in tabular format. No attempts were made to
formally test any differences between demonstration and roll-out
stores as the intervention models applied differed and the sample
of only 17 demonstration stores was not large enough to allow
robust analyses.
Qualitative data. Qualitative data were analysed using the
framework method. [15,16] This began with familiarisation with
transcripts to identify recurrent themes. The first interview
transcript was then analysed in-depth, examining each quote
and allocating it to a pre-determined or newly emergent theme.
The resulting thematic framework was applied to subsequent
transcripts and distilled into key subject areas with both
representative quotes and summaries of overlapping views.
In the results section, quantitative data related to each specific
aim are presented and relevant quotes from the qualitative
interviews used to elaborate and develop possible explanations for
the quantitative findings. Further themes identified during analysis
of the qualitative data are then presented. This approach allows
integration of the quantitative and qualitative findings and ensures
that each informs interpretation of the other. [17,18]
Consent and Research Ethics
Representatives of stores where observations were conducted
and individuals who took part in qualitative interviews provided
written, informed consent to take part and were offered a £10
high street shopping voucher as a ‘thank you’ for participating.
Ethical approval was provided by Newcastle University Research
Ethics Committee (application 412).
Results
All 87 stores were mapped. In-store observations were
conducted in 15 of 17 (88%) demonstration stores and 59 of 70
(84%) roll-out stores. Ten interviews were conducted. There were
no differences in the proportion of stores that were located in
deprived areas, urban areas, areas with poor existing access to
FFV, or all three between those stores that did and did not agree to
in-store observations (data not shown).
Fidelity of Intervention Implementation
Table 2 shows the results of the mapping exercise. Most stores
were located in areas with poor existing access to FFV. However,
only around three-quarters were in either deprived or urban areas.
Less than 60% of stores were located in deprived, urban areas with
poor existing access to FFV.
Table 1. Summary of intervention models.
Demonstration Stores Roll-out stores
Number of stores 17 70
Target location deprived, urban area with limited existing retail access to fresh fruit & vegetables
Point-of-sale materials & equipment provision of Change4Life branded materials, including: shelf ‘barkers’; shelf strips; A2 posters; chill stickers; window vinyls;
price over-clips
In-store support appointment of an existing staff member as ‘Fresh Food Champion,’ to oversee: fresh fruit & vegetables orders and
stocking, and compliance with Change4Life guidance
Launch leaflet launch leaflet in Healthy Start mailings, sent to households within a 1 mile radius
Intervention support extensive support from project delivery leader
Training for store personnel training DVD and manual
Chill cabinet Department of Health provided 50% of cost of a
new chill cabinet dedicated to fresh fruit &
vegetables
Change4Life branding materials provided for any existing
chill cabinet
Store layout changes significant changes, including: moving fresh fruit &
vegetables to front of store; expanding space
dedicated to fresh fruit & vegetables; mobile fresh fruit &
vegetable stand
some changes, possibly including: moving fresh fruit &
vegetables to a more prominent position; expanding
space dedicated to fresh fruit & vegetables; mobile fresh
fruit & vegetable stand
Promotional activities in-store sampling of fresh fruit & vegetables by local
children and support for integration with other
Change4Life campaigns, including Cook4Life and
Breakfast4Life; with support from local Primary Care
Trust
support for integration with other Change4Life initiatives,
including Cook4Life and Breakfast4Life; with support from
local Primary Care Trust
Average cost per store £5100 £300
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039431.t001
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appropriate location, but that this information was not acted upon
(Box S1, quote A).
The prevalence of Change4Life branded point-of-sales materi-
als and equipment was low (less than 40% for all items except
Change4Life branded chill cabinet). Similarly, the frequency of
appropriate use of these materials and equipment was low
(Table 3). Only around half of stores used all of the Change4Life
branded point-of-sales materials and equipment present in their
stores appropriately.
Those retailers who were provided with part-funding for a chill
cabinet identified this as a particularly attractive aspect of the
intervention during interviews (Box S1, quote B). Interviewed
retailers highlighted that the branded point-of-sales materials were
not durable and that replacements were unavailable (Box S1,
quote C). Many retailers interviewed felt the programme was
intended to be a short-term intervention that had now lost
momentum (Box S1, quote D).
The member of the DH strategic leadership team who was
interviewed was aware that branded materials were not always
used as intended, but believed that there was a policy for
preventing this (Box S1, quote E). It is not clear if retailers were
aware of this policy, or what penalties could be imposed, given that
all materials were provided up-front.
Variety, Purchase Price and Quality of FFV in Intervention
Stores
The variety, quality and comparable purchase price at a major
supermarket of FFV in intervention stores is summarised in
Table 4. In nine stores, comparable purchase price was available
for less than three lines, primarily due to prices not being displayed
in stores, and these stores were excluded from the price analyses.
The median number of FFV lines per store was 26. Around one in
three of these lines fell into ‘core’ categories, defined by
intervention guidance as the minimum range that should be
stocked (i.e. potatoes, onions, carrots, bananas, apples and
tomatoes). Almost all FFV was judged to be of good quality.
Overall, FFV in intervention stores cost around 10% more than at
www.tesco.com.
A number of retailers commented during interviews that the
intervention prompted them to expand their FFV range (Box S2,
quote A). All retailers interviewed seemed conscious of the need to
display high quality stock. Spoilage and wastage was identified in
interviews as a significant barrier to stocking more FFV. Whilst
this problem seemed insurmountable to some retailers, others
identified it as a necessary initial stage in expanding their range
(Box S2, quote B). Some retailers suggested in interviews that they
limited their range of FFV to lines with a longer shelf life for this
reason (Box S2, quote C). The issue of waste did not seem to
permeate back to the DH team (Box S2, quote D). Many retailers
commented that financial support to cover waste, at least in the
early stages, would have been welcomed (Box S2, quote E).
Motivation for Taking Part and Benefits to Retailers
The majority of interviewees were strongly supportive of the
health improvement intentions of the intervention (Box S3, quote
A). However, the specific aims of the intervention were less clearly
understood (Box S4, quote B), and the potential impact on health
questioned (Box S6, quote D). Whilst some retailers reported that
they took part to support health improvement, most were also
Table 2. Fidelity of intervention: location.
Marker of fidelity
Demonstration stores
(n=17)
Roll-out stores
(n=70) All stores (n=87)
N (%) in most deprived 40% of areas in England 14 (82.4) 53 (75.7) 67 (77.0)
N (%) in urban areas 13 (76.5) 55 (78.6) 68 (78.2)
N (%) .500 m network distance from a supermarket 17 (100) 63 (90.0) 80 (92.0)
N (%) all of above 12 (70.6) 37 (52.9) 49 (56.3)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039431.t002
Table 3. Fidelity of intervention: equipment presence & appropriate use.
Marker of fidelity
Demonstration stores
(n=15)
Roll-out stores
(n=59) All stores (n=74)
N (%) with Change4Life branded chill cabinet
1 14 (93.3) 28 (47.5) 42 (56.8)
of which, N (%) used appropriately 9 (64.3) 14 (50.0) 23 (54.8)
N (%) with Change4Life branded shelves 8 (53.3) 19 (32.2) 27 (36.5)
of which, N (%) used appropriately 3 (37.5) 10 (52.6) 13 (48.1)
N(%) with Change4Life branded stand 5 (33.3) 18 (30.5) 23 (31.1)
of which, N (%) used appropriately 0 (0) 6 (33.3) 6 (26.1)
N (%) with fresh fruit & vegetable champion 3 (20.0) 14 (23.7) 17 (23.0)
N (%) with branded chill cabinet, shelves, stand & champion 1 (6.7) 1 (1.7) 2 (2.7)
N (%) with all equipment present used appropriately 5 (33.3) 34 (57.6) 39 (52.7)
1This refers to chill-cabinet branding only – demonstration stores received a new chill cabinet with Change4Life branding in place. Roll-out stores received stick-on
branding materials for any existing chill cabinets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039431.t003
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particularly valued part-funding of a chill cabinet, whilst others
were glad of free point-of-sale materials. A number of retailers
reported that they had little or no choice over whether or not they
took part in the intervention and this was associated with lack of
engagement (Box S3, quote B).
Whilst the member of the DH strategic leadership team was
aware that commercial factors were likely to drive retailer
motivations, they did not necessarily view this negatively. In
contrast, the health worker interviewed was strongly opposed to
DH funding what they felt was a commercial venture (Box S3,
quote C).
Initial and On-going Communication
During interviews it became clear that many retailers and
symbol group managers did not feel that there was enough
communication between themselves and either the DH strategic
leadership team or the project delivery team. Although the
member of the DH strategic leadership team stressed that clear
communication of the interventions aims to all concerned was
central to success (Box S4, quote A), a number of others
commented that they were never absolutely clear what the aims
were (Box S4, quote B). The loss of momentum of the intervention
was frequently blamed by interviewees on poor communication
(Box S4, quote C).
Sustainability Plans and Links with the Public Sector
Linking stores to local health workers, and hence to community
initiatives, was not straightforward. In addition to poor commu-
nication, this appears to have been largely due to lack of clarity
around roles and responsibilities. The health worker interviewed
was resistant to taking on a role that they felt was more about
business development than health improvement (Box S5, quote A);
whilst the regional area manager felt this was exactly the health
worker’s role to (Box S5, quote B). Although the health worker,
area manager and retailers all gave examples of when they had
tried to link up, these were generally stories of failure (Box S5,
quote C). The member of the DH strategic leadership team
focused more on instances when links between stores and public
sector organisations had worked, rather than reasons why, and
problems caused, when it had not (Box S5, quote D).
Effects on Sales, Profit, Diet and Health
Sales of FFV were reported to improve following the in-
tervention. However, this was often against a background of
ongoing improving FFV sales (Box S6, quote A). Improvements
were also often from a very low base (Box S6, quote B) meaning
that any impact on profits was small. Some retailers felt that their
small store size meant they would never be able to compete
successfully with the major supermarkets on FFV (Box S6, quote
C).
Substantial scepticism was expressed during interviews over
whether the intervention was effective in improving customers’
diets. Whilst the intervention was particularly targeted at
individuals living in more deprived circumstances, this was itself
identified as a barrier to success (Box S6, quote D). The health
worker wanted to see data from a formal outcome evaluation
before drawing conclusions on effectiveness, whilst the member of
the DH strategic leadership team described a case study which
they felt was strong evidence of effectiveness (Box S6, quote E).
There was also some scepticism about the focus of the intervention
on fresh, rather than frozen or canned fruit and vegetables – both
of which may have been more convenient than FFV for small
retailers and consumers (Box S6, quote F).
Discussion
Summary of Results
In this process evaluation of the Change4Life convenience store
programme in the North East of England, we found substantial
evidence that the intervention was unlikely to be effective.
Fidelity in terms of location of intervention stores was relatively
high. However, around two years after initial implementation,
fidelity in terms of presence and appropriate use of Change4Life
branded point-of-sales materials and equipment was low.
A number of possible reasons why the intervention was unlikely
to have been successful were identified, including: poor availability
of replacement point-of-sale materials; lack of financial support for
FFV waste in the early stages; and failure to cement intended links
with health workers, schools and community organisations. Poor
initial and on-going communication between stakeholders was also
identified as a significant problem and likely contributed to the
other problems listed.
Strengths and Weaknesses
This mixed-methods process evaluation sheds light on whether
or not the Change4Life convenience store intervention could have
led to sustained improvements in customers’ FFV intake from
a variety of perspectives. The mapping exercise and observational
data give objective information on the fidelity of intervention
implementation, whilst the qualitative interviews provide more in-
depth understanding. The qualitative component revealed topics
of concern that fell outside the quantitative focus and that could
have gone unrecognised without the use of mixed-methods.
[17,18]
Table 4. Variety, quality and purchase price of fresh fruit & vegetables.
Demonstration stores (n=15) Roll-out stores (n=59) All stores (n=74)
Median (IQR) number of fresh fruit & vegetables lines 29.0 (23.0–39.0) 24.0 (13.0–33.0) 25.5 (14.8–35.0)
Median (IQR) % of fresh fruit & vegetables lines in ‘core’ categories
1 32.4 (30.8–35.3) 36.1 (31.2–50.0) 35.0 (31.0–44.4)
Mean (SD) % of fresh fruit & vegetables good quality 99.9 (0.5) 98.9 (4.1) 99.1 (3.6)
Mean (SD) purchase price/item as % of equivalent www.tesco.com purchase
price
2
107.9 (11.9) 109.2 (13.3)
3 108.9 (12.9)
4
1Core categories = potatoes, onions, carrots, bananas, apples and tomatoes.
2restricted to items with comparable line at www.tesco.com.
3number of stores =50, in 9 stores prices were available for fewer than three lines and these were excluded from this analysis.
4number of stores=65.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039431.t004
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term implementation of the Change4Life convenience store
programme. Although DH did commission a number of small-
scale evaluations all were conducted during the early phases of the
intervention. [9,19]
We used an observational proforma designed specifically for this
study to collect in-store data. This has not been validated.
However, there was evidence of good inter-rater agreement. Given
the novel nature of the intervention being evaluated, existing in-
store tools [20,21] would not have met our requirements.
Comparison purchase prices were collected from the major
supermarket a maximum of five weeks after in-store observations
were conducted. Seasonal price fluctuations may decrease the
accuracy of these comparisons. As we collected on-line comparison
prices, we were also unable to judge quality of FFV in the major
supermarket.
As we did not conduct an outcome evaluation, we are not able
to draw any firm conclusions on the effect of the intervention on
dietary quality of store customers. Nor did we include any
customers in our interviews. The sales increases reported were
based on retailer self-reports, rather than objective data. We
cannot conclude from this uncontrolled evaluation that the specific
components of this intervention were responsible for the changes,
particularly sales increases, seen.
Interpretation of Findings
Whilst the in-store components of the intervention were clear
and stable from the start (Table 1), other aspects of the
intervention (e.g. links to health workers, schools and community
initiatives) never achieved stability. These aspects were added
retrospectively and it seems likely that many of the frustrations
experienced by interviewees reflected the lack of clarity surround-
ing these components. Although it is useful to refine interventions
as they develop, [22] clear aims, objectives, roles and responsibil-
ities need to be identified early and only altered after dialogue with
all parties.
In order to achieve public health benefit, interventions must
either have large reach, or large individual level effects, or,
a combination of both. [23] The Change4Life convenience store
programme had limited reach. In addition, our evaluation suggests
that the intervention is likely to have a very low long-term effect
size at the individual level, if any at all, because of the low fidelity
of the intervention.
Implication of Findings for Policy, Practice and Research
The tensions caused by introducing the health worker
component of the intervention during roll-out suggest that, as far
as possible, the nature of any intervention should be clarified and
agreed with all parties before widespread implementation. Some
early discussions with retailers may also have helped refine the
intervention to provide something that was more appropriate for
the business environment in which they work.
The need for good and on-going communication between all
those involved in funding, planning and delivering complex public
health interventions has been discussed extensively. [24,25] This
was clearly recognised by all those we interviewed, but was not
always achieved.
The process of identifying intervention stores involved identi-
fication of potential stores by the project delivery team in
conjunction with regional symbol group managers. The routine
statistics that we used in our mapping exercise were not used by
the implementation team and this probably explains why not all
stores were located in areas that could formally be classified as
deprived, urban and with poor existing retail access to FFV.
However, the data we used are readily accessible and relatively
easy to use. Those delivering interventions should be aware of
routine data that can help them during planning phases.
By focusing our evaluation on implementation fidelity and
process around two years after initial implementation, we were not
able to determine if the intervention ‘worked’ – in terms of
increasing FFV intake of store customers. However, we have
generated substantial evidence that the intervention was unlikely
to have ‘worked’. This study was achieved using limited resources
and provides good justification that a larger, more resource
intensive, outcome evaluation of this intervention is not warranted.
A staged approach to intervention evaluation, as well as
intervention development, [26] is likely to represent the most
effective use of resources. This should be conducted separately
from pilot and feasibility work. [27] Sequencing of these research
stages can be guided by evaluability assessment. [23]
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